The objective of this study was to investigate the main characteristics of social information disclosure and attempt to explain the results in light of Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Voluntary Disclosure Theory. Our sample consisted of the top 30 Brazilian firms and top 30 UK firms listed on the stock exchange of each country according to Forbesʼ global ranking of the 2000 largest firms in the world in 2008, year when the study was initiated. The study was exploratory and based on information collected from annual accounting statements and social reports related to the fiscal year ended on 31/12/2010, available after the second half of 2011. Data were submitted to content analysis using as categories and subcategories of analysis the indicators of Corporate Responsibility recommended in the United Nations Guidance published in 2008. The indicators most frequently disclosed by both Brazilian and UK firms were "total revenues" and "payments to government", explained by Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory. The second and third indicators more frequently disclosed by firms in both countries were "voluntary contributions to civil society" and "total new investments" and it may be justified by the three theories above and attributed to the influence of the stakeholders to whom the information is destined. The least frequently disclosed indicators were "local purchasing", explained by the Stakeholders Theory and "number of convictions for violations of corruption-related laws or regulations and amount of fines paid/payable", explained by the Voluntary Disclosure Theory. Brazilian and UK firms were found to have relatively similar disclosure patterns. The study constitutes a contribution to the literature on the phenomenon of social information disclosure in light of Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Voluntary Disclosure Theory. It also innovates by comparing company information on CSR against a concise UN-developed model of social indicators.
INTRODUCTION
The demand for social information has increased in step with the growth of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement. In addition to developing socially responsible actions, organizations are disclosing social information in their ARAÚJO JÚNIOR, J. F.; OLIVEIRA, M. C.; PONTE; V. M. R.; RIBEIRO, M. S.
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This body of information has been the object of a wide range of academic studies.
In general, organizations are not obliged to adopt or disclose CSR practices, though many choose to do so. What motivates organizations to adopt CSR practices? Why do competitors follow suit and engage in similar practices? What kind of information is disclosed? How much is disclosed? Answers to these questions are not easy to find and depend on perspective, focus and contextualization.
CSR is doubtless a popular subject among researchers. Nevertheless, few studies have focused on the reasons why firms adopt and disclose CSR practices and the implications thereof. At first sight, firms may appear to disclose social information simply to improve financial results and/or maximize share prices on the capital market. However, as shown by our review of the literature, the subject is much more complex than that and cannot be understood merely from a quantitative point of view.
In this study, we attempt to answer the question: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Stakeholder Attributes and their Influence on Social Information Disclosure
Stakeholder Theory is based on concepts of social contract, legitimacy and ethics. According to Social Contract Theory, a social contract exists between society and organizations in general with implicit and explicit terms to be observed by the latter. The terms reflect the expectations of society in relation to each organization.
However, expectations change over time and, according to Alam (2006, p. 209) , an important function of company management is to monitor for changes in expectations in order to make appropriate adjustments to company operations and disclosure of activities.
In the perspective of Stakeholder Theory, Social Contract Theory provides parameters with which stakeholder groups and their expectations may be identified in relation to the organizations in which they hold stakes. (FREEMAN, 1984) The models vary in amplitude: some are merely concerned with identifying stakeholders, others go further and classify them, determine their level of priority and propose how to manage them.
According to Mainardes, Alves and Raposo (2011, p.230) , the manager must to identify the stakeholders, understand their needs and stablish a relationship with them.
It can be very difficult for an organization to recognize actors or groups of stakeholders that directly or indirectly affect or are affected by its activities and to plan and carry out strategies corresponding to the expectations of actual or potential stakeholders. In view of this problem and based on the definitions of stakeholder ---from the most comprehensive, such as "any individual or group affecting or affected by the attainment of company objectives" (FREEMAN, 1984) , to the most restrictive, such as "individuals or small groups with power to manage, negotiate or change the According to Mitchell et al (1997) , stakeholders are internal and external actors directly or indirectly affecting or affected by the activities of an organization. In addition, stakeholders must possess at least one of three attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. In the absence of these attributes, the individual or group loses the ability to affect or be affected by the organization and therefore ceases to be a stakeholder. However, as pointed out by Martins and Fontes Filho (1999) , the three attributes should be analyzed against the characteristics of each organization, reflecting the relative importance conferred to different types of resources. For example, organizations more or less dependent on financial resources are highly susceptible to the actions of capital holders, such as banks, whereas organizations whose performance is strongly tied up with their image need to be particularly concerned with actors capable of influencing public opinion, such as the media. On the other hand, organizations liable to break certain regulations are vulnerable to the coercive power of the State. Based on these differences, Tilt (1994) developed an approach to analyze the relation between stakeholder pressure and company strategy.
Legitimacy, the second attribute of the model, is important in that it reinforces the exercise of power while reducing resistance to authority in those who are subject to it. Suchman (1995) defines it as the assumption or general perception that the actions of an actor are desirable or appropriate within a given socially constructed system of rules, values, beliefs and definitions. To Martins and Fontes Filho (1999) , the concept of legitimacy as something socially desirable implies the assumption that social actors cannot always clearly define what is desirable in a given circumstance.
The actions of a given social actor may be considered desirable or legitimate at both the macrosocial level (society as a whole) and the microsocial level (the organization), at only one of these levels, or at neither. The first situation may be illustrated by a non-governmental organization purchasing products from a ARAÚJO JÚNIOR, J. F.; OLIVEIRA, M. C.; PONTE; V. M. R.; RIBEIRO, M. S.
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Following the reasoning of Mitchell et al (1997) , "urgency", the third attribute, reflects the need for immediate attention to a demand due either to time sensitivity (when delay in attending to the claim is unacceptable) or criticality (risk of damage to property, feelings, expectations or exposure). A case of "urgency" may be when citizens are concerned about the efficient use of tax money in view of social demands (education and security) in need of immediate action to prevent serious consequences for the population. In short, the interaction between the organization and stakeholders in possession of one or more of these attributes influences the level of social information disclosure of the organization.
Voluntary Disclosure Theory and Social Information Disclosure
According to Murcia and Santos (2010) , voluntary disclosure consists in the choice between disclosing and not disclosing information whose publication is not obligatory. According to Gamerschlag, Möller and Verbeete (2011, p 236-237) , some characteristics of the company define whether it will disclose information about CSR:
visibility, profitability, ownership structure and relationship with stakeholders.
According to Healy and Palepu (2001, p.420) , studies about disclosure assume the premise that, even in efficient markets, managers have greater volume and quality of information about the expected future performance of their firms, compared to external stakeholders.
Voluntary Disclosure Theory is opposed to Normative Accounting Theory and therefore compatible with positive accounting. Its main purpose is to explain aspects of financial information disclosure. However, the theory has been expanded to include environmental and social information disclosure (VERRECCHIA, 1983;  ROVER; TOMAZZIA; MURCIA; BORBA, 2009).
According to Dye:
The theory of voluntary disclosures is a special case of game theory with the following central premise: any entity contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the entity, and will not disclose information unfavorable to the entity (DYE, 2001, p. 184) . Since the information is a crucial element in the decision-making process of the final users, the identification of these users is necessary in order to understand social information disclosure, answer questions regarding information quality and quantity, disclosure levels, methods and patterns, and focus on comparability and predictability.
Many agencies regulating information disclosure adopt the view that the level of disclosure should satisfy the basic needs of information users in general, subsidizing their decision-making processes, and that the criteria used in the production and reporting of such information (accounting policies, methods of calculation, etc.) should be clearly stated (HENDRIKSEN; VAN BREDA, 1999) .
According to Bedford and Beladouni (1962 apud DIAS FILHO, 2000) , information be disclosed in a format allowing for comparisons and predictions or in the form of accountability reports?
These questions must be answered to determine the importance of information disclosure by top management to all stakeholders (HENDRIKSEN; VAN BREDA, 1999) . Hendriksen and Van Breda (1999) believe the ideal level of disclosure depends on the level of social well-being it produces and, with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), stress that to produce social wellbeing, information should be timely, comprehensible, neutral, representative, fair and complete.
According to Faria and Pereira (2009, p. 3), without proper information disclosure, stakeholders are unable to analyze and follow the activities of the organization, let alone determine whether it is socioenvironmentally responsible.
The current increase in socioenvironmental information disclosure is a result of the rapid dissemination of the concept of corporate accountability. In the opinion of many stakeholders, the concept of organizational performance ought to be expanded beyond merely economic parameters of interest to shareholders alone. Essentially, the objective is to widen the scope of the concept of accountability.
Nevertheless, much of the social information disclosure made in response to stakeholdersʼ demand for transparency is still voluntary, thus unregulated. 
Legitimacy Theory and Social Information Disclosure
According to Pereira, Bruni and Dias Filho (2010) , the Legitimacy Theory suggests that when companies disclose corporate information they intend to be perceived as legitimate and to ensure their continuity.
Derived from Political Economy Theory, Legitimacy Theory is based on the concept of social contract and on the assumption that organizations depend on legitimacy for their survival. Organizations operate within an ample social system, on which they produce an impact and by which they are likewise impacted. If they ignore the expectations of society, they will find it difficult to perpetuate themselves.
When organizations identify, understand and satisfy the demands of stakeholders, their decisions, decision-makers and the organization as a whole acquire legitimacy. According to Alam (2006) and in the perspective of legitimacy, the concept of social contract indicates the need for managers to contemplate the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders bent on profit maximization.
As described by Deegan (2006) through reports (such as sustainability reports) published as supplements to mandatory financial statements, using specifically designed disclosure models.
According to Dias Filho (2007) , in the context of Legitimacy Theory, social information disclosure is a means to acquire, sustain and recover legitimacy within the social system.
In all these concepts, legitimacy is seen as the result of the alignment between corporate policies and the value and belief systems of the environment in which the organization operates. This is necessarily so because the activities of the organization produces externalities, i.e. the organization produces an impact on, and is impacted by, the external environment. To some, the interaction between the organization and the environment is so important that the ensuing legitimacy is viewed as a resource on which many organizations depend, to a greater or lesser extent, for their survival.
Deegan (2006) believes that if legitimacy is perceived to be threatened in such a way as to compromise the success of the organization, Legitimacy Theory may suggest a course of action to remedy the problem. This will usually involve increasing the disclosure of information describing the organizationʼs activities.
An organization can only perpetuate itself to the extent it is considered legitimate by society. In other words, society confers upon the organization a state of legitimacy. As explained by Deegan (2006) , it is not the actual conduct of the organization that is important, it is what society collectively knows or perceives of the organizationʼs conduct that shapes legitimacy.
Thus, despite being eminently positive, Legitimacy Theory is also normative. It is positive when used to describe or predict organizational behaviors based on empirical facts; it is normative when used to design strategies to acquire, retain, manage or regain legitimacy.
According to Shocker and Sethi (1974 apud DEEGAN, 2006) , the concept of social contract implies two basic conditions: the delivery by the organization of socially desirable ends and the distribution of economic, social, or political benefits to groups from which it derives its power. As explained by the authors, due to fluctuations in societal dynamics, expectations and needs are subject to change.
Managers should therefore regularly make sure the social benefits provided are relevant and that the organization is approved by society. When an organization does not abide by the terms of the social contract, the latter may be revoked by society, such as when consumers decide to stop purchasing a given product. This type of behavior may be the result of environmental awareness. In addition to loss of consumer loyalty, the supply of raw material may be disrupted, workers may go on strike, government agencies may issue fines or NGOs may lay pressure on the organization as punishment for breaking the social contract.
The According to Dias Filho (2007) , expectations may be seen as part of a tacit social contract, adherence to which implies legitimacy for the organization.
Conversely, actions in breach of this contract would be considered illegitimate. In fact, the entire organization may lose its legitimacy and eventually be forced to discontinue.
In the perspective of Legitimacy Theory, the perpetuation of the organization depends on its ability to adhere to the value system predominant in the environment.
One way to further this is to disclose information of interest to the major An increasing number of firms are concerned about presenting an image of environmental awareness. Socioenvironmental information disclosure is a widely used mechanism to satisfy or manipulate societyʼs environmental perception and ensure approval.
As a tool, Legitimacy Theory, with its approach to socioenvironmental information disclosure, may be used to change societyʼs perception of the organizational environment. In this, it is comparable to the theoretical framework of other theories, such as Voluntary Disclosure Theory and Stakeholder Theory, in which the target audience plays an essential role.
METHODOLOGY
The study was exploratory and based on information collected from annual accounting statements and social reports and submitted to content analysis. Our 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Disclosed Practices
Square 2 provides an overview of the 15 CSR indicators recommended by the UN and the empirical findings of socioenvironmental information disclosure by the 60 firms in our sample. None of the firms presented full disclosure of all 15 indicators.
Even in the most compliant firms, disclosure was partial for many of the indicators. 
Analysis by Category and Subcategory
Trade, investment and linkages
The indicator "total revenues" was fully disclosed by all Brazilian and UK firms in accordance with UN recommendations. This may be explained by the existence of accounting regulations in each country which determines the disclosure of revenues in accounting statements. Nevertheless, in light of the theories discussed in the study, firms are likely to wish to disclose total revenues, whether disclosure is mandatory or not.
Thus, in addition to providing information on the organizationʼs volume of exchange with the environment, the disclosure of total revenues makes it possible to assess the size of the organization and its capacity for absorbing human and nonhuman resources. This is important since it informs us about the organizationʼs From the point of view of the stock market, total revenues organized in chronological order provide an idea of the history of organizational performance. This may be used as an argument to attract or retain shareholders. In this case, disclosure may be interpreted in light of Voluntary Disclosure Theory: for firms traded on the stock market, the disclosure of this indicator, whether mandatory or not, serves to maintain or increase market value and the potential for capital raising.
Firms are required by the government to disclose total revenues especially because the indicator is used directly or indirectly to calculate taxes. In Brazil, in addition to being used to calculate earnings subject to income tax, the indicator "total revenues" is used to estimate another important tax, the so-called "social contribution on net income". Both taxes are major components of federal government revenues.
Finally, the disclosure of total revenues makes it possible for society in general to assess the importance of the organization, especially in the local context. The importance of this indicator in more than one way confirms the claims of Stakeholder Theory and Voluntary Disclosure Theory.
Unlike total revenues, the disclosure of which is tied up with strict accounting regulations, the indicator "total new investments" is disclosed voluntarily. This difference was reflected in the collected data. As shown in Square 2, the indicator was not fully disclosed by all firms in the sample. Interestingly, the overall level of disclosure was similar in Brazil and the UK.
New investments are generally associated with increased production capacity due to the acquisition of facilities, machinery, equipment and intangible assets. Since new investments are often expected to contribute to reducing poverty and social inequality, the disclosure of this indicator may be an act of social marketing, adding value to the organizational image. In the perspective of Legitimacy Theory, the disclosure of new investments helps aggregate legitimacy and reputational capital to the organization.
The pattern of disclosure of "local purchasing" (Square 2) was rather similar in Brazil and the UK, with "no disclosure" being the rule, although, somewhat surprisingly, three Brazilian firms disclosed the indicator fully.
Each type of information is relevant to a specific stakeholder or group of stakeholders. Thus, as a stakeholder, the government ought to be particularly ARAÚJO JÚNIOR, J. F.; OLIVEIRA, M. C.; PONTE; V. M. R.; RIBEIRO, M. S.
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Using the typology of Mitchell et al (1997) within the framework of Stakeholder Theory, it is possible to understand the low level of disclosure of the indicator "local purchasing": although the government is a socially recognized actor in possession of the attributes "power" and "legitimacy", the absence of the attribute "urgency" allows organizations to neglect disclosure. The three attributes (power, legitimacy, urgency) must be present to ensure disclosure. In the case discussed, "urgency" may take the form of an effective interest and demand for information on part of the government.
As suggested in the UN guide on CSR indicators, information on local purchasing is an important subsidy in national policy making. Moreover, the disclosure of this indicator may be considered an act of social accountability.
A comparison of the indicators in the first group (total revenues, total new investments and local purchasing), shows that i) the full disclosure of total revenues in both groups is due to the strictly normative nature of this indicator, ii) the high overall level of disclosure of new investments may be explained by Stakeholder
Theory since this information is a direct indication of the solidity and growth potential of the organization. Shareholders, as a major group of stakeholders, expressly request disclosure of investments and, as shown by the typology of Mitchell et al (1997) , possess the three attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, iii) the low level of disclosure of local purchasing can be explained in light of Stakeholder Theory: the most important stakeholder (the government) lacks the attribute required to prompt disclosure, namely "urgency".
Employment creation and labor practices
Disclosure was rather similar for the indicators "total workforce" and "employee wages and benefits" (Square 2). Quantitative and financial information is often disclosed simultaneously and in the same part of the report. However, despite the relatively high level of disclosure overall, disclosure tended to be partial rather than full, when compared to UN recommendations.
This behavior may be understood with the help of Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory. Information on employment creation and labor practices is very Theory, the government has the legitimacy and and power required to demand disclosure of these indicators. However, it may not have the urgency since some organizations may already be reporting directly to the government rather than publishing the information in reports for wider audiences. In this case, the disclosure patterns fall outside the scope of the present study which, as explained in the section on methodology, was based entirely on information collected from annual accounting statements and social reports downloaded from the websites of the sampled firms and the respective stock markets.
From the perspective of Legitimacy Theory, the indicators "total workforce"
and "employee wages and benefits" are highly relevant to society in general and to trade unions. Unfortunately, neither stakeholder group has a large enough measure of the attribute "power" to enforce disclosure.
As explained in the section of theoretical framework discussing Voluntary Disclosure Theory, in the absence of pressure from the environment, organizations
are not apt to increase disclosure, especially with regard to information that may be used against them in legal disputes by trade unions and related public agencies. For example, a recently privatized Brazilian electricity distribution company controlled by a foreign organization was indicted by the Public Prosecutor after the voluntary disclosure of social information revealing almost the entire workforce to be outsourced.
In short, the mostly voluntary nature of the disclosure of these indicators in annual reports explains the uneven and predominantly partial disclosure pattern observed.
The level of disclosure was even lower for the indicator "total number and rate of employee turnover": eight Brazilian and five UK firms disclosed it fully, whereas seven Brazilian and two UK firms disclosed it partially.
Stakeholder Theory helps explain the predominance of partial disclosure of "employee wages and benefits" and "total number and rate of employee turnover".
Stakeholders without property rights, such as employees and trade unions, are seen as mere production factors and lack the influence required to enforce disclosure.
Disclosure of the indicator "percentage of employees covered by collective ARAÚJO JÚNIOR, J. F.; OLIVEIRA, M. C.; PONTE; V. M. R.; RIBEIRO, M. S.
Advances in Scientific and Applied Accounting. São Paulo, v.7, n.2, p. 175-200, 2014. 194 agreements" was predominantly null. As explained above, the government may request this information directly from firms through public agencies supervising labor relations rather than demanding disclosure through social reports. In addition, in the perspective of Stakeholder Theory, the lack of relevance of this information to shareholders may account for the low levels of disclosure observed.
On the other hand, if the relation between firms and workers is well established in the country and organizational legitimacy does not appear to be in jeopardy, managers may no longer see the disclosure of this information as essential to retaining legitimacy. Since progressive labor and wage policies are taken for granted in both the UK (a first world country) and Brazil (a rapidly developing economy), these factors are unlikely to represent a threat to organizational legitimacy. Thus, it is not surprising if firms are not giving priority to the disclosure of this indicator.
Technology and human resource development
As shown in Square 2, UK firms and Brazilian firms presented similar patterns of disclosure of the indicator "expenditure on research and development", with a near-equal predominance of full disclosure and no disclosure. The pattern may be explained by Stakeholder Theory, according to which strategic stakeholder management is a means of achieving the organizationʼs ultimate goal of maximizing shareholder profits.
Expenditure on research and development are closely linked with the competitive advantages necessary to advance the organizationʼs economic goals.
Thus, the disclosure of this indicator may occur in response to pressure from shareholders; that is, managers may use disclosure to persuade shareholders the organization is prepared to face challenges posed by market competition in the future. It may also be explained by Voluntary Disclosure Theory, according to which managers would expect to make a favorable impact on shareholders by voluntarily disclosing this type of information.
The indicator "average hours of training per year" was disclosed by eighteen Brazilian firms (full disclosure: 5; partial disclosure: 13) and by six UK firms (full disclosure: 2; partial disclosure: 4) (Square 2). The corresponding figures for "expenditure on employee training per year" were twenty-seven (full disclosure: 6; partial disclosure: 21) and six (full disclosure: 1; partial disclosure: 5) (Square 2). The low level of full disclosure may be due to the extensive detailing of these indicators in the UN guide. In the perspective of Stakeholder Theory, the major users of this information (workers and trade unions) lack the attributes of "power" and "urgency" (Mitchell et al, 1997) necessary to prompt disclosure.
Health and safety
In contrast with the indicators analyzed thus far, UK firms and Brazilian firms differed strongly with regard to the level of disclosure of the indicator "Cost of employee health and safety", as information was fully disclosed by 23 Brazilian firms versus only 6 UK firms. The difference was even more marked for firms with no disclosure (2 Brazilian firms versus 19 UK firms). Five firms from each country presented partial disclosure (Square 2).
Employee health and safety is usually a major responsibility of the organization, depending on the legal framework of the country. Thus, low investments in this area is often associated with low productivity and losses, both of which are suggestive of inefficient management (UNITED NATIONS, 2008).
The indicator "work days lost due to occupational accidents, injuries and illness" was fully disclosed by 9 Brazilian firms and 11 UK firms (Square 2). Unlike most of the indicators analyzed in the present study, disclosure was greater among UK firms. The lower level of disclosure observed for Brazilian firms may be explained by Voluntary Disclosure Theory, which is based on the assumption that only information favorable to the organization is disclosed voluntarily.
Government and community contributions
As illustrated in Square 2, the indicator "payments to government" was fully disclosed by all Brazilian and UK firms, in accordance with UN guidelines. The typology of Mitchell et al (1997) , in the perspective of Stakeholder Theory, can help identify the factors responsible for this disclosure pattern.
In the present case, the government may be considered a definitive stakeholder, in possession of the attributes "power", "legitimacy" and "urgency", materialized in the existence of accounting regulations mandating disclosure of this ARAÚJO JÚNIOR, J. F.; OLIVEIRA, M. C.; PONTE; V. M. R.; RIBEIRO, M. S.
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Voluntary contributions to civil society were fully disclosed by 26 Brazilian firms and by 21 UK firms. However, when full and partial disclosure were pooled (26+0 firms vs. 21+5 firms, respectively), the total number of firms was the same in the two groups (Square 2).
Disclosure of this indicator was relatively similar for Brazilian firms and UK firms. The observed pattern may be interpreted according to the instrumental approach of Stakeholder Theory (stakeholder management policies are used to attain organizational goals), Legitimacy Theory (by meeting the information needs of groups of stakeholders other than shareholders, organizations show their commitment to the local community) and Voluntary Disclosure Theory (disclosure is used to make a positive impression on society).
Corruption
Disclosure of this type of information tends to produce a negative impact on the organizationʼs image. Square 2 shows that only two Brazilian firms and two UK firms disclosed the indicator fully, whereas partial disclosure was made by four and one firms, respectively. The predominant pattern was "no disclosure" (24 and 27 firms, respectively).
The observed pattern of disclosure may be explained by Voluntary Disclosure Theory: organizations hardly view any direct benefit in the disclosure of convictions for violations of corruption-related laws.
CONCLUSION
The indicators most frequently disclosed by both Brazilian and UK firms were "total revenues", justified by the three theories above, and "payments to government", explained by Stakeholder Theory and the typology of Mitchell et al (1997) .
The relatively high level of disclosure of the indicator "total new investments"
by firms in both countries may be attributed to the influence of the stakeholders to whom the information is destined, especially shareholders and investors in possession of the three attributes required to enforce disclosure, namely "power", "legitimacy" and "urgency". The typology is employed in strategic stakeholder management, within the conceptual framework of Stakeholder Theory.
The least frequently disclosed indicators were "local purchasing" and "number of convictions for violations of corruption-related laws or regulations and amount of fines paid/payable". Information on the value of local purchases is very important in the context of CSR. However, to appreciate its significance requires a better understanding of the contribution this information can make to the perception of the organization as socially responsible. Due to the limited awareness of this fact, stakeholders rarely demand the disclosure of the indicator, which is consequently assigned a lesser priority by the organization.
Brazilian and UK firms were found to have relatively similar disclosure patterns, indicating that the variable "country" did not have a significant impact on the results. The similarity between the two groups may also be explained by the large size of the firms in the sample (top firms on Forbesʼ global ranking), many of which are multinational and therefore subject to similar pressures and expectations from a wide range of stakeholders around the world.
Despite the reasonable level of disclosure of CSR practices observed in this study, there is much room for improvement. It should however be pointed out that the organizations in the sample may have engaged in CSR practices other than those disclosed in the annual reports from which our information was retrieved, or made specific information available directly on demand from stakeholders.
The moderate size of our sample may represent a limitation of the study.
Likewise, aspects not included in our analysis, such as the influence of business sectors and information regarding sales volume, equity and contributions to civil society, among others, could possibly have enriched the analysis of the patterns of social information disclosure.
Suggestions for future studies include replicating the study with more recent data to evaluate possible changes in behavior, and replicating the study with firms from countries other than the UK, for example comparing samples from South
American countries to our sample of Brazilian firms.
